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The Hypatia controversy surrounding RebeccaTuvel’s article “In Defence ofTransracialism” eli-
cited a flurry of responses on social media and in the
press (Bettcher 2017a; Dutta 2017; Oliver 2017;
Schuessler 2017; Singal 2017; Winnubst 2017) . In
her article, Tuvel defended a rather strict analogy
between gender transition and “transition to another
race” (Tuvel 2017a, 272) . Many scholars have denied
the validity of that analogy, either on philosophical
grounds or sociological ones (for example see Borck
2017; Sealey 2018) . Despite the fact that a whole
philosophy journal issue has been dedicated to the
controversy (Philosophy Today 2018, 62.1 ) , both in
journal articles and on social media there has been re-
latively little philosophical assessment of the trans-ex-
clusionary implications of the content and method of
Tuvel’s argumentation, particularly for transgender
women.1 This may not be surprising, for two reasons.
First, Tuvel’s claims concerning race and racial “trans-
itions” are the focus and most prominent (as well as
controversial) aspects of the article. Second, Tuvel ad-
opts an explicitly trans-positive approach, especially in
her express commitment to respect transgender iden-
tifications, and to regard them as legitimate (Tuvel
2017a) . It might then appear that the article is un-
equivocally trans(gender)-inclusive.
My goal in this contribution is to engage with Tuvel’s
article on the question of the trans-exclusionary and
marginalizing implications of some of her assump-
tions. Much of that trans-exclusionary thrust emerges
from Tuvel’s use of Haslanger’s definition of woman
(Haslanger 2012) . After the controversy her article
generated, Tuvel admitted that she “could have spent
more time grappling with the criticisms ofHaslanger’s
view” (Tuvel 2017b), so the present article might ap-
pear as nitpicking, an attempt to dwell on a matter
that has already been addressed. However, an essential
Atlantis Journal Issue 39.2 /2018 62
and original part ofmy project is to locate Tuvel’s pa-
per within a broader context of much traditional
philosophical practice that creates conditions of in-
justice for professional philosophers who belong to
marginalized groups. I can second—and wish to ex-
pand upon—Talia Bettcher’s (2017a) sentiment that
the controversy is not just about Tuvel’s article, but
presents a broader issue for philosophy, particularly a
certain traditional way of doing philosophy which fo-
cusses on the logical-epistemic goals of argumenta-
tion, and on the subsequent assessment of
argumentation in light of these goals. In contrast, an
ethical assessment of argumentation reveals that at
least some practices of professional philosophy expose
members of marginalized groups to injustices. More
specifically, I illustrate how Tuvel’s article instantiates
this type of injustice with respect to at least some
transgender women who engage professionally with
her argument. I do not contend that this is because of
Tuvel’s analytic approach in her article, nor that ana-
lytic argumentation generally leads to injustices with-
in argumentational exchanges (Botts 2018; cf. Tuvel
2018) . In fact, I employ analytic methods myself in
this article. The problems lie elsewhere, as I hope will
become clear.2
In the next section, I briefly discuss two main ways in
which we can assess philosophical argumentation: lo-
gical-epistemic assessment, and ethical assessment. I
then set up a framework in which to understand pro-
fessional argumentation as work with associated
goods and burdens. Just as in any work, there are
“bads’” to be avoided in the content and in the way
the work is structured, and goods that are legitim-
ately expected by those who undertake the work. I
then argue that the burdens of argumentation con-
sidered as work may be relatively greater in some
cases for professional arguers with particular identit-
ies or who are members of particular marginalized
groups. Tuvel’s article then serves as an example of
how this additional burdening can happen. After an-
ticipating some objections to my view, I end with
some general remarks regarding the eradication of in-
justices within professional argumentation.
The Logical-epistemic Perspective and the
Ethical Perspective on Argumentation
At some risk of over-simplification, I think one can
locate several broad responses to Tuvel’s article ac-
cording to whether a more “logical-epistemic” or a
more “ethical” assessment of her argumentation is ad-
opted. The former type of assessment has been the
more traditional approach within Anglo-American
analytic philosophy. It considers arguments from the
perspective of such measures as justification, rational-
ity, and convergence upon truth. In his New York
Magazine article, for example, Jesse Singal writes:
Anyone who has read an academic philosophy
paper will be familiar with this sort of argu-
ment. The goal, often, is to provoke a little—to
probe what we think and why we think it, and
to highlight logical inconsistencies that might
help us better understand our values and
thought processes. This sort of article is ab-
stract and laden with hypotheticals—the idea is
to pull up one level from the real world and
force people to grapple with principles and
claims on their own merits, rather than—in the
case of Dolezal—baser instincts like disgust
and outrage. This is what many philosophers
do. (Singal 2017)
In a similar vein, Justin Weinberg, editor of the
philosophy blog Daily Nous, says of Tuvel’s article,
“in terms of quality, it’s a very normal paper” (quoted
in Schuessler 2017) .
In contrast, in a Chronicle ofHigher Education piece,
Shannon Winnubst adopts an “ethical” assessment.
She focusses far more on the social position of the
potential addressees ofTuvel’s reflections. She states:
After all, the methodological insularity evid-
enced in Tuvel’s article and its publication ef-
fectively render ignored and disrespected black,
trans, and other minority scholars who work in
these fields doubly marginalized. The inequal-
ities perpetuated are both conceptual and prac-
tical. (Winnubst 2017)
I will consider these two ways ofnormatively assess-
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ing argumentation more closely. They are not mutu-
ally exclusive, and the way I describe them should be
regarded as “bare bones” accounts of each.
Roughly speaking, an argument is usually taken to be
a set of propositions. One or more of these proposi-
tions provides rational support for a particular pro-
position of the set, the conclusion. Argumentation is
the dialectical exchange of reasons for or against a
proposition (thesis) . The exchange can take written or
oral form. The logical-epistemic perspective considers
argumentation in itself, looking at the inherent goals
and standards of arguing, assuming that arguers are
generalized rational arguers, considered in the ab-
stract. Whatever else those arguers may be is irrelev-
ant to the assessment of argumentation (Bondy
2010) .
Logical-epistemic assessment of argumentation con-
siders the various “intrinsic” goals that argumentation
serves and assesses a given argument or arguments in
light of such goals understood as standards or criteria
for “good” argumentation. For example, it is generally
accepted that converging on truth (however con-
ceived) , or justifying and rationally persuading, are
among such intrinsic goals (Bermejo-Luque 2011 ;
Johnson 2000; Micheli 2012;) . These goals of argu-
mentation can be used to evaluate arguments and ar-
guers in a functionally normative way; one asks
whether—and how well—the arguments presented
have fulfilled one or more of these intrinsic goals.
Another possible type of assessment of argumentation
focusses more on “extrinsic” factors. Of course, what
is and is not “extrinsic” in the case of argumentation
depends on the goal of the exchange of reasons, the
degree of theoretical abstraction that one is willing to
perform, and on what one regards as appropriate to
abstract away from. Generally, the goals of argument-
ation in extrinsic assessment are considered as far
more dependent on the context of argumentation, in-
cluding the more particular interests of the arguers.
Within negotiation, for example, the goal may be to
reach a deal between parties with conflicting interests;
within deliberation, the extrinsic goal of argumenta-
tion is to choose and execute a particular course of ac-
tion (Paglieri and Castelfranchi 2010; Walton and
Krabbe 1995; cf. Mohammed 2016) . Other goals are
of a political or ethical nature. Such goals will be my
main focus in what follows.
Within philosophy in particular, argumentation has
been critiqued from an ethical point of view as re-
gards both method and style. There has been criticism
of Anglo-American philosophy’s practices of idealiza-
tion, to the exclusion of actual social hierarchies and
oppressions (Berenstain 2018; Mills 2005; various
contributions in Tessman 2009) . This kind of critique
can be viewed as “extrinsic” in that it focusses on the
way western philosophical argumentation has de-
veloped under the influence of particular historical
schemas or narratives (Peña-Guzmán & Spera 2017),
such as the recurring “argumentation-as-war” meta-
phor (Rooney 2010) . This is a sociohistorical critique.
However, the implication of such critique is usually
that philosophy as currently practiced is morally or
politically questionable since its historical self-concep-
tion—as mirrored in its practices and institutions—is
exclusionary of certain types of people, such as wo-
men. Although I do not take up sociohistorical ap-
proaches here, I will also point to exclusionary
tendencies in Tuvel’s argumentation.
More directly relevant to my limited project in this
article is the moral status of participants as rational
arguers, or—if argumentation is viewed as a process
for establishing true beliefs—as contributors to know-
ledge. There has been much recent interest within
philosophy in epistemic injustice. This type of injustice
occurs when members of marginalized groups suffer
prejudiced credibility deficits (testimonial injustice) or
prejudiced intelligibility deficits (hermeneutical in-
justice) in their status as contributors to knowledge
(Fricker 2013; McKinnon 2016) . The former are in-
justices that occur when someone’s testimony is not
granted the due credibility it deserves, simply on the
basis of the person’s social position. The latter is a res-
ult of the fact that oppressed members of society have
very little influence on the concepts, theories, and ter-
minology used to describe experiences that are partic-
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ularly in their interests to express. They are marginal-
ized within the process of discursive resource produc-
tion (hermeneutical marginalization) which then has
the effect that when they do actually attempt to ex-
press their experience of oppression, they are unintel-
ligible to the dominant group. This intelligibility
deficit is hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial and
hermeneutical injustices are closely linked to testimo-
nial quieting (Dotson 2011 ) in which members of
oppressed groups are silenced through dismissal of
their testimonies or else are constrained to adopt dis-
courses that do not fully reflect their experience. This
adoption occurs in the face of harmful ignorance,
prejudice, or bias that shape the receptive compet-
ence of their audiences.
Bondy (2010) has applied the notions of testimonial
injustice to argumentation, in what he calls “argu-
mentative injustice.” Bondy argues that in argument-
ation both credibility deficit and excess endanger one
of the goals of argumentation, namely, the justificat-
ory “force of reason” alone. There are three ways in
which this goal is frustrated. First, due to prejudicial
imbalances in credibility (and authority) among the
parties in a debate, the arguments that the respective
parties proffer are not considered as they should be
by the lights of logical-epistemic normativity. Second,
the status as arguer within the community of arguers
is diminished through credibility deficit or enhanced
through credibility excess. In either case, members of
the community cease to engage with proffered reas-
ons in the way they should: they will either tend to
“not bother” with the arguments of those perceived
to have poor arguer status or accord too much au-
thority to those who have enhanced status, simply as-
suming that they are correct. Third, those who suffer
credibility deficits will lose confidence and self-es-
teem as arguers and tend to withdraw from argu-
mentation. Those who enjoy credibility excess will
become over-confident and not engage with others at
all, or not as seriously as they should (Bondy 2010) .
So, arguments, the external perception of arguers,
and their self-perception are all affected by prejudicial
credibility defects and excess. The rationality of their
exchange is defective as a result.
Bondy considers how an “intrinsic” good of argu-
mentation, the force of rational justification, fails to
be realized because of epistemic injustice. He focusses,
namely, on the detriment caused to the normative, ra-
tional nature of argumentation: unjustly accorded
credibility deficits and excesses cause reasons to lose
the force that they should have. At first sight, it seems
that Bondy’s assessment is purely logical-epistemic.
Yet this impression arises only because he considers
the further logical-epistemic consequences of what
are—in the first instance—harms that possess a dis-
tinctly moral nature. For undeserved, prejudiced di-
minishment of arguer status within a community of
arguers is a moral harm, a type of disrespect.
Moreover, if we accept that attributed credibility ex-
cess to members of dominant groups is “contrastive”
(Medina 2011 ) then credibility excess accorded to
some will likely cause credibility deficits suffered by
others, by members of subordinate groups, leading to
similar moral harms. It is this relative diminishing
and enhancement of status between marginalized and
socially dominant or privileged arguers that is, to my
mind, the primary moral harm. The primary harm
then leads to logical-epistemic harms (failure of ra-
tionality) as well as to other moral harms (lack of self-
esteem, exclusion) . One might note, by way of addi-
tion, that further moral harms for the marginalized
arguers also include the limitation of “epistemic
agency, one’s ability to pursue epistemic projects, and
epistemic autonomy, one’s ability to pursue epistemic
projects that stem specifically from one’s distinct lived
experience” (Pohlhaus 2014, 1 10) .
My own approach to the assessment of argumentation
engagement with Tuvel (2017a) is related to the sec-
ondary moral harms that authors such as Fricker,
Dotson, Medina, Pohlhaus and Bondy discuss—loss
of self-respect, loss of epistemic confidence or excess-
ive epistemic confidence, various forms of silen-
cing—but the primary injustice is different. The
primary injustice consists in the following: the content
or structure ofthe argumentational exchange itselfplaces
disproportionate burdens on socially marginalized ar-
guers or exposes them to the risk ofpsychological harms.
There need be no denial of credibility, yet the second-
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ary effects can be similar; cognitively burdened ar-
guers will find their self-esteem can be affected, and
they may exclude themselves from debates that are of
vital interest to them. To distinguish this notion of
injustice from Bondy’s I will use the generic term “ar-
gumentational injustice,” of which “argumentative
injustice” (involving prejudicial credibility deficits
and excess of which Bondy speaks) is just one type.
The two types of injustice I analyse in what follows
are also types of argumentational justice, but distinct
from Bondy’s. One involves disproportionate cognit-
ive burdens that arise due to social position. The oth-
er involves risk of psychological harm. Both arise
from engaging with arguments within an exchange of
reasons (that is why they are “argumentational” in-
justices) . In the next section, I give a brief account of
these injustices.
The Burdens ofArgumentational Work and
Associated Injustices
Nora Berenstain considers a type of labor that I be-
lieve argumentation, as I conceive it, may involve.
Particularly when challenged to explain the nature of
their own oppression, members of oppressed groups
perform a kind of discursive labor that can be ex-
ploitative, in that it is largely “unrecognized, uncom-
pensated, emotionally taxing” (Berenstain 2016,
569) . Inasmuch as explanations or testimonies of this
sort can be elements of proffering reasons within an
argumentational exchange, Berenstain’s notion of ex-
ploitative labor can also apply to argumentation.
However, in contrast to Berenstain, I assume that
participants in argumentational exchange do not en-
gage in argumentation in bad faith, are genuinely
willing to listen and to learn, and do not seek to take
credit for arguments that are not their own. That
said, I point out that there may still be additional,
uncompensated burdens for some transgender wo-
men as they engage with Tuvel’s argument.
In this kind of context, argumentational practice is
work, work that encompasses the activities of study,
the coherent and precise formulation of propositions
(such as theses and definitions) , the invention of ar-
guments and counter-arguments, the posing of incis-
ive questions and challenges to theses and arguments,
and so forth. This work will also devote itself to verbal
expression, such as trying to find the precise and clear
formulations for thoughts and arguments. As from
work in general, one is entitled to expect certain non-
monetary “goods” of work, such as excellence in per-
forming relevant tasks, social status, community and
collaboration, and a sense of self-respect (Gheaus and
Herzog 2016) . However, argumentational work—like
any work—also comes with burdens.
Some philosophical arguments are more difficult and
more complex than others. If those who consider and
try to understand those arguments and those who de-
velop them are equally intelligent and possess the
same argumentative acumen (an assumption I will
make) , we can say that some arguments require more
cognitive effort than others. We are talking about
what one might call the cognitive burdens of argu-
mentational work.
Yet, these are not the only burdens that come with
engaging in philosophical argumentation. Consider,
for example, ethics or political philosophy, or the
philosophy of gender and race, the disciplinary focus
ofTuvel’s article. In these fields, one is more likely to
discuss questions concerning identity, oppression, in-
justice, and marginalized groups. This, in turn, will
mean that some philosophers have an acute interest in
presenting or disputing arguments that treat their own
identity, oppression, or marginalization. That interest
arises because these philosophers are existentially in-
vested in presenting and correctly analyzing the in-
justices to which they themselves, as members of
marginalized communities, are exposed. It is thus an
over-simplification to consider merely the cognitive
costs of engaging in certain arguments. There may
also be significant emotional costs of some form. I
will not attempt to neatly distinguish the “purely”
cognitive realm from the emotional realm in relation
to argumentative burdens, and simply call all these
burdens “the burdens of argumentational engage-
ment” (BAE). The burdens involved are relative to a
particular person in the ways indicated above and are
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also relative to the subject matter and goals of an ar-
gument. What one wishes to argue for (or against) ,
the number of argumentative steps one needs to get
there, as well as the emotional burden one bears in
doing so, will influence the BAE.
Exposing someone to harm within an argumenta-
tional exchange is the second type of injustice I wish
to consider. In any collaborative venture undertaken
to secure important, common goods or bene-
fits—and I take argumentation to be such—increased
exposure of one party to harm on the basis of their
identity or social position is an injustice. Below, I fo-
cus on the risk of the psychological harm of misgen-
dering which, considered as a microaggression, has
been shown to cause harmful psychological effects
(Sue 2010; Nordmarken 2014; Kapusta 2016; Pulice-
Farrow, Clements & Galupo 2017) . My claim is not
that such harms necessarily occur within argumenta-
tional work but that there is an unwarranted selective
exposure of some of the arguers to the risk of these
harms, and this exposure occurs due to the fact that
they are members of a marginalized group, that is,
socially situated within systems of subordination.
In summary, here are two types of injustice that can
occur within argumentational work:
(i) Those who, due to morally irrelevant
factors, in particular their social position, have
to bear a relatively higher burden of argument-
ational engagement (BAE) in securing the
goods of argumentational work, suffer an in-
justice. For example, one’s gender identity or
membership in a marginalized group is a mor-
ally irrelevant factor. If BAE is relatively higher
due to such factors, an injustice occurs. This is
a version of a “benefits and burdens principle”:
all other things being equal, those who collab-
orate towards similar goods (benefits) of work
should be equally burdened. I will call this in-
justice “disproportionate BAE.”
(ii) Like any work, argumentational work is
unjust if it exposes arguers to the risk of psy-
chological harm, on the basis of their social
position. I will call this “harm injustice.”3
Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis ofTuvel’s
argument to see how her article risks inflicting the
above injustices on trans women as they engage with
it.
The Transgender Burdens in Rebecca
Tuvel’s “In Defense ofTransracialism”
I will point out the implicit misgendering in Tuvel’s
article, the manner Tuvel deals with it, and consider
its microaggressive character. Misgendering occurs, I
claim, because some trans women who engage with
Tuvel’s argument are denied membership of the class
woman or, from the point of view of offering reasons
within an argumentational exchange, it is at least left
undecided or indeterminate whether they are women
or not. It is worth noting that the misgendering is in-
ferential, that is, the transgender woman must engage
with Tuvel’s argument argumentationally to realize
that she is being misgendered. This is an important
aspect of this type of argumentational injustice. It is
not the case that excesses of deficits of credibility di-
minish rational engagement with arguments, thus res-
ulting in rationality deficits. Quite the opposite: it is
through engagement with reasons, that is, through the
drawing of inferences from the claims and arguments
put forward that the misgendering occurs.4
As regards the injustices involved in such a situation,
one can say that since misgendering imposes emo-
tional burdens on the transgender woman that cis-
gender arguers do not bear, disproportionate BAE
occurs. Further, inasmuch as insistent misgendering is
a microaggression or micro-invalidation (Sue 2010) ,
there is also a risk ofharm injustice.
At the beginning of her discussion of the moral ac-
ceptability of racial self-identifications, Tuvel states
the general principle that “we treat people wrongly
when we block them from assuming the personal
identity they wish to assume” (Tuvel 2017a, 264) . In
the final section of her article, and in the accepted
style of philosophical argumentation in the analytic
tradition, Tuvel then anticipates an objection to her
general argument. The objection is that Tuvel’s ac-
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count of race and gender based on self-identification
seems far too permissive. What, after all, is to stop
someone self-identifying as a wolf, for example, or
some completely other being? Are we to respect such
a self-identification? No, says Tuvel, and she suggests
the following moral constraint on the recognition of
self-identities:
It is reasonable for a society to accept
someone’s decision to enter another identity
category only if it is possible for that person to
know what it’s like to exist and be treated as a
member of category X. Absent the possibility
for access to what it’s like to exist and be
treated in society as a black person or as a man
(or as an animal) , there will be too little com-
monality to make the group designation mean-
ingful. For example, if a cisgender white man
fights for his rights not to be subject to anti-
black police violence or to misogyny, yet never
faces the possibility of having his rights so viol-
ated, we can reasonably expect allyship, not
identification, from him. (272)
Tuvel thus espouses the following constraining prin-
ciple on the recognition of people’s self-identification
that I define as PossibleKnowledge:
PossibleKnowledge: For x’s self-identification
with a gender category g or with a race cat-
egory r to be ethically acceptable, it must be
possible for x to know what it is like to exist
and be treated as a member of g, respectively of
r.
Tuvel is expressing a condition for the reasonableness
or ethical acceptability of a gender or racial self-iden-
tification. But it is important to realize how this con-
dition combines argumentatively with Tuvel’s
endorsement of Sally Haslanger’s definitions of
gender and race (Tuvel 2017a, 273-4) . Let us focus
on the perspective of trans women. Haslanger defines
a woman as follows:
S is a woman if S is systematically subordinated
along some dimension (economic, political,
legal, social, etc.) , and S is “marked” as a target
for this treatment by observed or imagined
bodily features presumed to be evidence of a fe-
male’s biological role in reproduction.
(Haslanger 2012, 230; 250)
Tuvel sees in this definition the potential for includ-
ing trans women in the definition of woman. The
reason for this is that the bodily features Haslanger
mentions in her definition need only be imagined. To
be a woman, a transgender woman does not actually
have to possess vagina, ovaries, or a uterus, for ex-
ample. In Tuvel’s argument, PossibleKnowledge—com-
bined with Haslanger’s definition (let us call the
combination PossibleKnowledgeFromSocialPerception)
—requires only that it be possible that the trans-
gender woman be socially perceived as possessing fe-
male sexual characteristics, thus be classified as a
woman, and so know what it is like to be so classified.
If this chain of events ensues, her self-identification is
reasonable or ethically acceptable.
However, Haslanger’s definition of woman has been
critiqued for its trans-exclusionary character (Jenkins
2016) . [5] That critique points out that Haslanger ex-
cludes from the category woman those transgender
women who are not perceived as being in possession
of female reproductive organs. In an endnote—and
almost as an afterthought—Tuvel acknowledges this
critique and simply states that she is open “to the pos-
sibility that there might be ways to know what it’s like
to exist and be treated as a woman without being so
classed by others” (Tuvel 2017a, 276-77) . She does so,
presumably, to avoid the conclusion that the gender
self-identifications of trans women who do not “look”
female or are not generally considered within society
to be capable of female role in reproduction, are not
morally acceptable. For without this caveat, this is
what PossibleKnowledgeFromSocialPerception would
imply.
Tuvel thus seeks to avoid misgendering these trans
women. Yet, there is scope for injustice in any argu-
mentational engagement by trans women with Tuvel’s
article:
(i)Disproportionate BAE. “Filling in the argu-
ment”—that is, showing how it is possible to
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know what it is like to exist and be treated as a
woman without being so classified, without
“passing” as a cisgender woman—is postponed
to a later date, and left simply as a claim as-
sumed to be rationally arguable. From the
point of view of reasons proffered, it is left un-
decided, indeterminate. Yet, it is particularly in
the interest of the transgender women whose
self-identifications are deemed morally ques-
tionable due to PossibleKnowledgeFromSocialP-
erception that this additional argumentative
step be made. Of course, trans women who are
located at intersectionally precarious social po-
sitions are particularly affected. These include
trans women of colour who cannot present the
hyper-sexualized object of the racist gaze and
so cannot count as women in a racist culture,
or disabled trans women arguers, for whom it
is more difficult to perform the gender codes of
society, and thus to be treated as a member of
the category of women (cf. Clare 2009) . Or it
may be the transgender woman who cannot be
viewed socially as a woman due to socio-eco-
nomic class, especially if hormonal and surgical
interventions are expensive or access to them is
restricted. Older trans women who transition
in later life, when hormones do not have the
same “feminizing” effects, are also particularly
vulnerable to this inferential misgendering as
they engage with the article: These women are
at worst inferentially labelled as not women; at
best their being women is left undecided. In
either case, there will be a sense of alienation
and sense of lack of respect for their personal
struggles. An emotional burden is born that
cisgender persons will not experience when en-
gaging with the same argument.
(ii)Harm Injustice. The transgender woman
philosopher who is not viewed (classified) as a
woman within her social environment realizes
that she is implicitly misgendered as she en-
gages with Tuvel’s argument. This may not, in
itself, cause significant psychological harm. But
allied to the probable misgendering of these
people in their own society, as well as a certain
“tradition” in the philosophy of gender that is
known to have been trans-exclusionary
(Kapusta 2016; Jenkins 2016; Bettcher 2017b),
there is a danger of cumulative microaggres-
sions (Sue 2010; Nordmarken 2014; Pulice-
Farrow, Clements & Galupo 2017) . These can
cause actual psychological harms within the
professional community for trans women who
engage with this material. (I leave it as an exer-
cise for the reader to analyse how harm in-
justice or disproportionate BAE might arise
from engaging with passages from Bach (2012,
269) ; with Mikkola’s “equivocal cases” of wo-
man (2009, 578 ff.) ; with Witt’s vacillations re-
garding “third gender” conceptions of trans
people–including, presumably, trans women
(2011 , 41 ) ; with Zack’s disjunctive definition
of woman (2005) ; and with Alcoff’s woman-
defining “relationship of possibility to biologic-
al reproduction” (2006, 172)) . The continued
misgendering of “non-passing” transgender wo-
men can amount to repeated microaggression.
Moreover, in more extreme cases, some trans-
gender women’s self-respect may be under-
mined.
Some Objections and More Points to
Ponder
Let me anticipate some objections to my analysis.
First, one objection might consist in claiming that the
transgender population I have been considering is
very small. Perhaps there are—in point of fact—no
transgender women arguers who are affected by in-
justices in the way I have described. First, there may
in fact be no argumentational engagements by trans-
gender women inferentially misgendered by argu-
ments of the type I have described. Second,
philosophers or professional arguers may be more
psychologically robust than most, so that the misgen-
dering does not impose the burdens I have spoken of.
However, even if there were, in fact, no such engage-
ments by transgender women with arguments like
Tuvel’s or relevantly similar to Tuvel’s, the risk of in-
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justice or the potential threat of injustice is, itself, a
moral wrong. In response to the second point, the
anticipated objection portrays the philosopher as an
idealized rational agent, unperturbed by her social
position or marginalization. If really proffered as an
objection to my argument, it would reflect the image
of a disembodied, unemotional, unfeeling ideal of the
philosopher, a completely unrealistic portrayal, but
also one with sexist and misogynistic undertones
(Peña-Guzmán and Spera 2017; Berenstain 2018) .
It might be claimed that even if the transgender wo-
men I speak of suffer injustices in the ways I have in-
dicated, they nevertheless always retain the option of
simply not engaging with Tuvel’s article. However,
simply foregoing argumentational engagement with
Tuvel and other authors is a kind of “argumentational
smothering” akin to testimonial smothering (cf. Dot-
son 2011 ; 2014, 127) . Such a solution also causes
harms. First, there is the political harm of exclusion:
professional arguers who are transgender would tend
to exclude themselves from a discussion or even a
given sub-discipline, and the latter would then fail to
be or become trans-inclusive. Second, this solution
arguably brings a logical-epistemic harm given that
increased diversity of arguers opens professional argu-
mentation up to the insights of marginalized persons
and provides a corrective for misconceptions.
Relatedly, one could suggest that the injustices are
certainly possible but easily mitigated or eliminated
through the organization of academic argument. For
example, there might be some unwritten convention
that only marginalized persons should take part in
debates that directly touch upon their identities or
situation. This solution would—so the thought
goes—help to avoid the misgendering or other exclu-
sionary practices that relatively privileged professional
arguers have been known to engage in. However,
such a practice is also morally problematic. First,
members of the profession would be implicitly con-
strained to “out” themselves. Moreover, it would lead
to a kind of “sorting” of people within the academic
profession according to their identities or social
status. Even if such policy were implementable, it
could lead to morally, politically—and perhaps epi-
stemically—undesirable effects of another kind.
Philosophers from minority or marginalized groups
might feel burdened to undertake work in these areas
rather than, for example, in the philosophy of physics
or some other area where their creativity and argu-
mentational acumen is better served, and more fruit-
ful to the community. Their professional autonomy
and academic freedom would, thereby, be impaired,
and their work, perhaps, less productive.
A further objection might concern the perspective I
have taken of the risk of exposure to injustices for in-
dividual professional arguers who belong to marginal-
ized groups. Perhaps one should—so the objection
goes—look at longer-term consequences of such de-
bates. It may turn out, for example, that the philo-
sophical profession as a whole and in the longer term
benefits from these argumentational exchanges, even
if marginalized individuals who contribute to them
are subject to emotional harms or disproportionate
BAE. For example, the professional practitioners of
philosophy may become more aware and better in-
formed about their colleagues from marginalized
groups and alter their practices accordingly. With
time, philosophy will become more diverse, both with
regard to its professional membership, as well as with
regard to its methods and practices.
Responses to this objection will vary depending on
fundamental convictions regarding normative ethics.
A utilitarian approach might lead one to the conclu-
sion that a greater aggregate and long-term benefit is
furthered by the engagement of marginalized indi-
viduals in professional argumentation, and therefore
ethically justified, even if some marginalized indi-
viduals suffer by being disproportionately burdened,
psychologically harmed, or “sacrificed” in some other
way. Let me simply note that I place the emphasis on
individual dignity and equality. In line with this idea,
a harm experienced by an individual is not usually
justified by invoking an aggregate or general, long-
term benefit. Even if social progress often occurs in
this mode of individual sacrifice, that does not mean
that the wrongs that occur on the way are morally
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justified. This relates to what I believe to be a certain
moral dilemma facing marginalized philosophers and
which I will now briefly discuss.
Concluding Remarks: Marginalized Philo-
sophers Embracing a Dilemma?
Using a particular example, I have illustrated how
harm injustice and disproportionate BAE can arise
within the philosophical exchange of reasons.
The most reasonable way to mitigate the injustices I
have discussed is to not proffer arguments that im-
pose harm injustice or disproportionate BAE. We are
all charged with this task. Being widely read in critic-
al race theory, disability studies, queer theory, trans*
theory, and so on, as well as becoming actively in-
volved with, and attentively listening to, people who
are oppressed within society surely helps, for it cultiv-
ates awareness of the ways that our theories and argu-
ments can burden others.
There is a lingering doubt in my mind, however,
concerning the complete eradication of the injustices
I have discussed without a more major “overhaul” of
the professional culture of philosophy, and so I will
end on a somewhat pessimistic note. Tacit encour-
agement to put forward clever and “provocative”
claims that are more likely to be published, and an
excessive focus on logical-epistemic assessment of ar-
gumentation all contribute, I think, to a tendency to
be somewhat careless with regards to the moral im-
pacts of one’s own argumentation. There are also
blind spots in philosophers’ awareness of intersec-
tional axes of oppression and how ideas can impact
these, fostered by a lack of willingness (and time) to
go beyond strictly philosophical literature in one’s
own field. To my mind, this all points to a need for a
more general—and perhaps quite radical—reform of
professional institutions, culture, and practices. Yet,
as Kristie Dotson points out, such changes to socially
and historically entrenched practices and epistemolo-
gical systems can be very difficult (2014) .
Since change is likely very slow and incremental,
what are members of marginalized groups who are
philosophers to do in the meantime, when those who
are not marginalized along similar axes produce bur-
dening arguments? On the one hand, certain strategies
of argumentation produce disproportionate BAE, and
may also be harmful or potentially harmful. On the
other, some of those arguers directly exposed to the
burdens and injustices by these problematic strategies
are also those most likely to detect and expose them.
This creates a dilemma. There is an urgent need to ar-
gue in these cases. But the argumentational engage-
ment this involves will likely be disproportionately
costly, and risky. Perhaps the willingness and compet-
ence to engage nevertheless, are signs of a valuable as-
set in the struggle against injustice and signal a kind of
argumentational “burdened virtue” (Tessman 2005),
the virtue of a person undertaking engagement, even
as full enjoyment of the enticing goods on offer is
denied to her.
Endnotes
1 . I do not provide a full, detailed intersectional ana-
lysis of race and gender in this article, partly due to
constraints of length, and partly because my reflec-
tions are based on the experiences that come from my
subject position, namely, that of a white, trans woman
(who belongs to the academic precariat) . A full treat-
ment of Tuvel’s article would certainly require a more
thoroughly intersectional lens that considers race, es-
pecially given how Tuvel closely intertwines issues of
race and gender identity. I will, however, discuss some
intersections with being trans, such as race, class, age,
and disability, later in the article. For the purpose of
this article, I understand transgender women or trans
women as persons who were assigned as male at birth,
but who identify as women.
2. For a useful sketch of analytic feminism and its
uses, see Garavaso (2018) and Garry (2018) .
3. It is clear that a general point could be made about
how arguments concerning marginalized groups may
disproportionately burden or harm members of those
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groups (people of colour, women, LGBT people, or
those intersectionally positioned in any of these) . I do
not have the space to provide examples. The question
of why such instances warrant the term “injustice”
would need more development. Let me simply note
two points on this subject. First, the argumentational
injustices discussed here are objectionable harms or
unfairness, or constitute the threat of objectionable
harms or unfairness. Second, those affected are mem-
bers of social groups, not simply individuals who
happen to have certain sensibilities (such as in the
case of an arguer who fears spiders considering an ar-
gument about spiders) . The emotional burdens are
linked in some causal way to social position. I would
like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging me
to make this point clearer.
4. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
challenging me to better explain the “argumentation-
al” character of this injustice.
5. One should note that Jenkins’ own proposed cor-
rective to Haslanger’s account, involving the notion
of “having a female gender identity,” has itself been
critiqued for being trans-exclusionary. See Andler
(2017) . The details of this further debate are not dir-
ectly relevant to the present article.
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